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Abstract
This paper argues that foreign direct investment in economies with
credit market imperfections may increase their vulnerability to capital
ﬂow shocks. Due to better access to ﬁnancial markets foreign ﬁrms can
use other wage contracts than domestic ones. This alters the domes-
tic wage composition and the subsequent wealth distribution. When
credit markets are imperfect, the wealth distribution typically deter-
mines an economy’s growth potential in autarky; hence, high exposure
to foreign direct investment may signiﬁcantly impede the capability
to recover from sudden withdrawals of foreign capital. This is sub-
stantiated by empirical evidence on durations of output recovery after
systemic sudden stops.
Keywords: Credit market imperfections, foreign direct investment,
growth, occupational choice, sudden stops.
JEL: F43, F23, O16
1 Introduction
In economies where capital is scarce and credit market imperfections are
severe, foreign direct investment can provide an adequate means to channel
capital to its most productive use. Independent of further eﬀects such as
technology spill-overs or disciplinary eﬀects of ﬁercer competition, foreign
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1capital inﬂows may enable the undertaking of proﬁtable projects that oth-
erwise would not have been implemented, and thus boost domestic growth.
This may, however, come at the cost of increased vulnerability to sudden
capital outﬂows, the relevance of which is underlined by the ongoing global
ﬁnancial crisis.
Better access to international and corporate ﬁnancial markets by a for-
eign owner extends the set of feasible wage contracts in foreign owned ﬁrms.
Hence, their wage proﬁles can be expected to diﬀer systematically from those
of domestic ﬁrms. Indeed empirical evidence (reviewed in the following sec-
tion) indicates that higher exposure to foreign direct investment tends to be
related to higher wage inequality across ﬁrms, which is only partly explained
by a skill premium that foreign owned ﬁrms oﬀer for higher education. This
matters, as in the presence of credit market frictions the distribution of
wealth and income has a role in determining the dynamics of economic
growth (as pointed out by Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Galor and Zeira,
1993, and a subsequent literature). We demonstrate that the equilibrium
wage distribution under foreign direct investment may inhibit the formation
of next period’s stock of potential domestic entrepreneurs, rendering the
host economy vulnerable to capital ﬂow shocks such as sudden stops.
This is the case when imperfect domestic ﬁnancial markets limit the abil-
ity of domestic ﬁrms to diversify risk, which implies higher default risk for
domestic than for foreign owned ﬁrms. This in turn reduces the set of feasi-
ble wage contracts under limited liability and forces domestic entrepreneurs
to oﬀer unnecessarily high powered incentives to their employees. Foreign
owned ﬁrms on the contrary have access to international and corporate cap-
ital markets, and are able to align incentives provided by wages to the un-
derlying problems of moral hazard. For many tasks, in particular simple
ones where output is easily observable, these do not require high powered
incentives. This may generate higher variance of wages between successful
and unsuccessful domestic ﬁrms than is the case for foreign ﬁrms, albeit
foreign ownership confers a wage premium on average. Supporting evidence
based on ﬁrm level data is presented in the following section.
Suﬃciently high success wages in domestic ﬁrms enable recipients’ oﬀ-
spring to become entrepreneurs despite the credit market frictions. Hence,
riskier wage proﬁles in domestic ﬁrms imply social mobility and ensure a
sustainable stock of future potential domestic entrepreneurs. This implic-
itly provides a de facto insurance against systemic shocks that lead to sudden
withdrawal of foreign capital from the domestic economy, as domestic en-
2trepreneurs are needed to overcome the credit rationing caused by credit
market frictions. Wage proﬁles in foreign ﬁrms have lower success wages
and thus may fail to enable workers’ oﬀspring to be potential entrepreneurs
in the next period, even when wages paid by foreign owners are higher on
average. Ironically, the diversiﬁcation of idiosyncratic risk in foreign ﬁrms
increases the vulnerability to systemic shocks of the host economy.
Following this line of reasoning, higher past exposure to foreign direct
investment impedes an economy’s ability to respond to sudden withdrawals,
or sudden stops, when domestic credit market frictions are suﬃciently severe.
This provides a testable prediction that is consistent with a ﬁrst glance at
the evidence. We use a sample of 33 systemic sudden stops (as classiﬁed
by Calvo et al., 2006) in 23 countries between 1980 and 2000. These were
typically triggered by currency crises and contagion, and are thus unlikely
to depend on past exposure to foreign direct investment. We ﬁnd that
past inﬂow of foreign direct investment delays the duration of a full output
recovery after a systemic sudden stop in economies characterized by weak
creditor protection (from Djankov et al., 2007).
We use a dynamic occupational choice model ` a la Banerjee and Newman
(1993), where domestic and foreign owners access diﬀerent capital markets,
and creditor rights are less well protected in domestic capital markets than
in foreign ones. Firms’ production is stochastic, so that debt-ﬁnanced do-
mestic ﬁrms default with positive probability and pay high success wages.
Setting up a ﬁrm requires an indivisible investment, and poor creditor rights
protection makes collateral necessary to obtain a loan. This leads to the
afore mentioned pecuniary intergenerational externality: success wages in
domestic ﬁrms are high enough to provide employees’ oﬀspring with enough
endowment to become entrepreneurs. Foreign ﬁrms are not borrowing con-
strained, diversify and oﬀer wage contracts with a lower success wage. This
may not suﬃce to create next period’s potential domestic entrepreneurs,
and thus impede social mobility. Better access to loans of foreign owners
and free entry implies that the domestic economy overcomes the credit ra-
tioning caused by domestic credit market frictions, and instantly reaches
the steady state allocation to which it would have converged only in the
long-run in the absence of foreign direct investment. Lack of potential do-
mestic entrepreneurs matters, however, when foreign direct investment is
withdrawn: higher past exposure to foreign direct investment yields a lower
stock of domestic entrepreneurs, which in turn reduces the growth rate after
withdrawal and prolongs the time to output recovery.
3In our model foreign direct investment has an unambiguously beneﬁ-
cial direct eﬀect on the host economy by providing access to more eﬃcient
capital markets, while the change in the composition of wages leads to an
adverse eﬀect only in case of sudden capital withdrawal. To keep our anal-
ysis tractable and focus on the composition eﬀect, we abstract from other
channels such as technological or human capital spill-overs from foreign to
domestic ﬁrms, or ﬁercer competition in domestic markets (see e.g. Fosfuri
et al., 2001, Markusen and Venables, 1999, among others). These beneﬁts
should matter particularly for economies that suﬀer from scarcity of capital
and severe capital market imperfections, i.e. relatively backward economies
(Findlay, 1978). Empirical ﬁndings on eﬀects of foreign direct investment
on growth remain ambiguous; eﬀects seem to be highly dependent on host
country characteristics (see the survey by De Mello, 1997). Mayer-Foulkes
and Nunnenkamp (2005) ﬁnd that U.S. foreign direct investment contributes
to convergence in income only for countries with a relatively high per capita
income ex ante, whereas eﬀects on middle and low income economies are ad-
verse. The same holds for studies of speciﬁc channels such as productivity
spill-overs (see the survey by G¨ org and Greenaway, 2004). Aitken and Harri-
son (1999) analyze panel data from Venezuela and ﬁnd a small net impact on
plant productivity, which appears to be seized entirely by joint ventures in-
volving multinationals. Similarly, Javorcik (2004) reports that productivity
spill-overs only occur through joint ownership or vertical linkages between
foreign-owned suppliers and domestic ﬁrms in upstream sectors in Lithua-
nia. Borensztein et al. (1998) ﬁnd that foreign direct investment seems to
be particularly eﬀective when the host country is endowed with suﬃcient
human capital; Alfaro et al. (2004) and Hermes and Lensink (2003) ﬁnd this
to be the case when local ﬁnancial markets are suﬃciently developed.
This paper is related to the literature on inequality and growth, partic-
ularly to studies that analyze eﬀects of changes in credit market frictions
on the dynamics of the wealth distribution and long run growth. Ahlin
and Jiang (2008) and Ghatak et al. (2001) use versions of the Banerjee
and Newman (1993) model and ﬁnd that better credit markets (through
introduction of micro credit institutions or better law enforcement) may be
accompanied by lower long-run growth. This is due to a distortion in occu-
pational choice, since micro credit is available for certain occupations only,
or to lower incentives to save when rents diminish. Gall (2008b) shows that
when credit market imperfections are severe enough, minor improvements
of formal credit markets may crowd out alternative, more eﬃcient ways of
4allocating capital such as ROSCAs, and generate an individual poverty trap.
Other related theoretical literature includes Grossman (1984), where for-
eign direct investment serves as an insurance device and eﬃciently crowds
out domestic entrepreneurs in a static setting with risk averse agents. Young
(1991) argues that opening the domestic market to foreign trade may induce
poor economies to specialize in less proﬁtable and less advanced sectors to
their detriment. Matsuyama (2004) considers a model that allows for in-
equality of economies despite capital market integration. His argument re-
lies on the absence of foreign direct investment, however. Balc˜ ao Reis (2001)
puts forward the argument that foreign direct investment might reduce do-
mestic welfare as proﬁts are expatriated.
The paper proceeds by presenting evidence on the variation of wages
across domestic and foreign ﬁrms in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the
model framework. We then develop the baseline model of the domestic
economy in autarky in Section 4 and allow for foreign direct investment in
Section 5. Section 6 analyzes the eﬀects of sudden withdrawal of foreign
capital and provides some supporting evidence, and Section 7 concludes.
The more cumbersome proofs and statistical tables are in the Appendix.
2 Empirical Pointers
Our argument works through the eﬀect of foreign direct investment on an
economy’s growth dynamics via the income distribution. Therefore a closer
look at the empirical relationship between foreign direct investment and the
host country’s wage distribution is in order.
Empirical work tends to ﬁnd that inequality rises as foreign direct invest-
ments grow. Tsai (1995) and Choi (2006) examine eﬀects of foreign direct
investment on income inequality and ﬁnd evidence for a positive relation-
ship; eﬀects seem to vary in less developed countries, however. Other studies
focus on the eﬀects on wage inequality in developed and developing coun-
tries and tend to conclude that foreign direct investments correlate with an
increase in the premium for higher education, potentially amplifying wage
inequality (see Aitken et al., 1996, Feenstra and Hanson, 1997). Lipsey and
Sj¨ oholm (2004) report that wages in foreign owned ﬁrms in Malaysia are gen-
erally higher and that this wage premium increases in workers’ educational
attainment. This may also aﬀect investments: in a cross country study Basu
and Guariglia (2007) document a positive correlation between foreign direct
investment and both human capital inequality and growth rates.
5Hence, wages paid by foreign owners seem to be higher on average, and
more so for higher educated workers, which may increase wage inequal-
ity. This is primarily a statement on the wage variance across employees.
However, the variation of wages across ﬁrms might follow a diﬀerent pat-
tern. In particular, when insolvency is relevant due to poor ﬁnancing of en-
trepreneurs, wages in foreign owned ﬁrms may exhibit less variation across
ﬁrms than wages in domestic ﬁrms. Consistent with our assumption of lower
risk diversiﬁcation in domestic ﬁrms, empirical ﬁndings suggest that default
occurs more often in domestic ﬁrms than in foreign owned ﬁrms, see e.g. Li
and Guisinger (1991) for the US and Mata and Portugal (2004) for Portugal.
The issue of wage variation across ﬁrms depending on whether ownership
is domestic or foreign has received scant attention in the literature. Hence,
we take a glance at the data, using the World Bank Enterprise Survey for
27 Eastern European and Central Asian countries in 2004. This database
covers balance sheet information, ﬁrm characteristics, and managers’ assess-
ments on major obstacles to growth that are comparable across countries.
Overall, the sample contains information for over 6000 ﬁrms. At a ﬁrst
glance coeﬃcients of variation indicate that wage variation is higher across
domestic ﬁrms in 21 out of 24 countries.1 Moreover, the maximum ﬁrm-level
wage rate in absolute terms was paid in all countries by a domestic ﬁrm.2
Figure 1 plots the ﬁtted densities of the wages in domestic and foreign
ﬁrms resulting from an OLS estimation (dashed line) of (the log of) a ﬁrm’s
average wage on a dummy variable (for-OECD), set to 1 if a ﬁrm is owned
by a foreign ﬁrm from an OECD country and 0 otherwise. The estimation
includes country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects, and a vector of the following
ﬁrm-level control variables: a ﬁrm’s share of part-time employees, share of
employees with a higher education, share of skilled employees, size, hiring
restrictions, and a dummy for whether or not a ﬁrm is an exporter. Com-
paring wage distributions in Figure 1, the one among domestic ﬁrms has
more mass in both tails than the one among foreign owned ﬁrms. This is
corroborated by a quantile regression (see Figure 6 in the Appendix) show-
ing evidence for an inverted u-shaped relation between foreign ownership
1Exceptions are Bulgaria, Macedonia and Moldova. As a convention we treat a ﬁrm
as foreign owned if at least 10 percent are owned by a company from an OECD country.
Our results are robust to alternative deﬁnitions, e.g. whether the headquarter of a ﬁrm is
located in a foreign country. Moreover, the available data underestimate the true wage
variance among domestic ﬁrms as wage payments of defaulting ﬁrms are not observed.
2Note that these rankings do not change if we exclude domestic multinationals, i.e.
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Figure 1: Density of ﬁtted wage in domestic and foreign owned ﬁrms
premium and the ﬁrm’s quantile in the distribution of paid wages.
While there is little ambiguity at the bottom end of the distribution of
paid wages, the picture is less clear at the top. Therefore we examine in
greater detail the relationship between wages and foreign ownership among
high-wage ﬁrms, speciﬁcally ﬁrms that pay the 10% or 5% highest (i.e. suc-
cess) wages in the sample. In particular, we test the hypothesis that high-
wage ﬁrms pay relatively lower wages if they are foreign owned (note that
we suppose that the opposite is true for all other moderate-wage ﬁrms).
Therefore, we regress the log of a ﬁrm’s average wage on (i) a high-wage
dummy variable3 hi90/95 (set to 1 if a ﬁrm’s average wage is above the
90% (95%) wage quantile and 0 otherwise), and (ii) two interaction terms
between the foreign ownership dummy and the mutually exclusive high-
(foroecd-hi90/95) and moderate-wage dummies (foroecd-lo90/95), re-
spectively. Moreover, we include country and industry ﬁxed eﬀects and the
same control variables as before. In the last two speciﬁcations of both tables,
we additionally control for ﬁnancial indicators that describe a ﬁrm’s access
to ﬁnance.4 Note that we consider two diﬀerent deﬁnitions of foreign owner-
3Tables 1 (2) show that high-wage ﬁrms pay, on average, 4 (4.5) times higher wages.
4The ﬁnancial indicators comprise a dummy if a ﬁrm is listed on a stock market, the
amount of collateral a ﬁrm has to put up for an average loan relative to the loan value,
7ship: more than 10 percent owned by a foreign ﬁrm from an OECD country,
and headquarter is in a foreign country. The latter deﬁnition corresponds
to two additional interaction terms labeled forhq-hi and forhq-lo, respec-
tively. In both Tables 1 and 2, we ﬁnd that foreign ownership commands a
wage premium for moderate wage levels (foroecd-lo and forhq-lo). This
wage premium declines when controlling for additional ﬁrm speciﬁc char-
acteristics, and vanishes when controlling for the ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial frictions.5
This means that better access to international and corporate capital markets
by foreign owners helps to explain to the foreign ownership premium.
Moreover, the foreign ownership premium for high wage ﬁrms (the top
quantile) has a negative sign throughout, rendering it a discount. However,
the corresponding coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant throughout only when foreign
ownership is deﬁned by the location of a ﬁrm’s headquarter. We regard
this as the natural deﬁnition of foreign ownership as the primary concern is
whether ﬁrms have access to foreign credit markets. For example, domes-
tic ﬁrms pay 1.4 (1.8) times higher wages than foreign owned ﬁrms in the
top 10% (5%) wage quantile after controlling for the eﬀects of additional
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrm characteristics. This substantiates our hypothesis that
successful (i.e. high wage) domestic ﬁrms pay better; thus the wage distri-
bution among domestic ﬁrms has more mass in both tails than the one among
foreign owned ﬁrms. Of course, we cannot rule out that foreign owners se-
lect into similar ﬁrms that pay above average wages, although our controls
include industry ﬁxed eﬀects, share of employees with high skill/education,
size, hiring restrictions, whether a ﬁrm exports or not, and ease of access to
ﬁnancial markets. Any selection story has to account for foreigners’ cherry
picking of high productivity ﬁrms (Javorcik, 2004). High productivity is
likely to be related to adequate provision of incentives, for instance through
bonuses. This would lead us to expect high success wages, and thus higher
wages in successful ﬁrms, among the foreign ﬁrms, however.
In sum, in the labor markets in our sample (i) foreign owned ﬁrms pay on
average higher market wages, (ii) the market wage premium due to foreign
ownership vanishes after controlling for ﬁrms’ access to ﬁnance and (iii)
foreign owned ﬁrms pay lower wages than domestic ﬁrms in the top end
of the wage distribution, which is consistent with higher success wages in
domestic ﬁrms.
and the average interest rate a ﬁrm has to pay for an average loan.
5This is consistent with the observation that ﬁrms with access to loan markets with
higher creditor rights protection choose safer investment projects by Acharya et al. (2009).
83 A Simple Framework
In the following we present a simple model of growth in the presence of
credit market imperfections, where domestic and foreign ﬁrms set the same
expected wage and the wage variance is higher across domestic ﬁrms.6
3.1 Agents
In each period   the domestic economy is populated by a continuum of
agents endowed with unit measure. An agent   is born with initial wealth
  . Denote the density function of the domestic wealth distribution in period
  by   ( ). Agents obtain utility from consumption    of the single good at
the end of their lives, from bequests to their oﬀspring   , and from exerting
eﬀort    in production according to the utility function
  =  
1− 
   
 
  −   (1 −  )1−  (  ),
where   ∈ (0,1) is a preference parameter determining the bequest share.
That is, agents are risk-neutral in income    as   =     −   (  ) with   =
  (1 −  )1− . Bequests and thus endowments of an agent’s oﬀspring are
given by   +1 =    =    .
3.2 Production
The single good is produced in ﬁrms or in subsistence. A ﬁrm consists
of two members, a manager and a worker, and requires a ﬁxed setup cost
of   units of the good.7 Production is stochastic yielding output   if the
ﬁrm succeeds and 0 if it fails. Successes or failures are independent events
across ﬁrms. Manager and worker diﬀer in the extent to which their eﬀort
determines the ﬁrm’s success probability. Assume for simplicity that the
success probability is the manager’s eﬀort   ∈ {0; }, with 0 <   < 1. Eﬀort
choice of the manager is not contractible. Choosing eﬀort   the manager
incurs a cost of  ( ) =  , and  (0) = 0 otherwise.8
6The results are consistent with a foreign ownership premium in expectations; equal
expected wages facilitate the exposition, especially the comparative statics of the model.
7Our qualitative results extend to ratios of workers to managers greater than unity.
Letting factor inputs vary in ﬁrms, e.g. by endogenizing ﬁrm size, considerably increases
complexity of equilibrating the labor market and adds distortions in production technology
choices (see e.g. Gall, 2008a), blurring the focus of this paper.
8The model is consistent with eﬀort choice of workers, for example if a worker’s task
produces easily measurable output. This is best thought of as the entrepreneur’s choice
determining quality and the worker’s choice determining quantity.
9If not in ﬁrms agents produce in subsistence, which yields an income of
  > 0 units of the good and does not require eﬀort. Assume that    −   −
  > 2 , that is production in ﬁrms using eﬀort   is eﬃcient.
3.3 Timing
The timing of events in the economy is as follows. At the beginning of a
period   labor and capital markets open and agents choose capital invest-
ments and occupations. The labor market is competitive and cleared by an
expected wage ¯  ∗
  that equates labor demand and supply. Then production
takes place and projects’ successes or failures realize. At the end of a period
agents are paid out, decide on bequests and consume.
3.4 Credit Market
Agents can borrow or lend at the world market interest rate   in a credit
market.9 That is, the domestic economy has access to foreign credit markets,
subject to domestic imperfections. The domestic credit market is subject
to frictions in the form of moral hazard on the side of the borrowers. If a
project succeeds, a borrower may wrongfully announce that the ﬁrm failed
and attempt to abscond with the revenue. With probability   she is caught
by her creditors and loses the ﬁrm’s revenue.   is best interpreted as the
quality of creditor rights protection in an economy.
3.5 Domestic Firms
A domestic ﬁrm is set up by a domestic entrepreneur who becomes owner
and manager of that ﬁrm. The investment   needed to set up a ﬁrm can be
ﬁnanced out of wealth or by borrowing on the credit market. A loan contract
speciﬁes a loan   and a repayment   to be paid to the creditor unless the
entrepreneur defaults. A default occurs when an entrepreneur reneges on
outstanding payments, loan repayments or wages. A labor contract speciﬁes
a wage   to be paid to the worker in case of no default. If the project fails
output is 0 and the entrepreneur necessarily defaults if her wealth does not
suﬃce for all payments,    <   +   . Denote the expected wage by ¯  .
Given labor and loan contracts, and supposing that the entrepreneur will
9Exogeneity of the interest rate is not driving our results on the dynamics, cf. Section
6, where the interest rate is allowed to vary.
10announce the state of the ﬁrm truthfully, she chooses eﬀort   if
 (  − − ) −   +  (  −( − )) − ( − ) ≥  (  −( − )) − ( − ).
Hence,   =   if  (  − − ) >  , and   = 0 otherwise. Since loan and labor
markets are competitive,  +  = (  +¯  )/ , where   = max{ −  ;−¯  / }.
Therefore   =   is implementable for all    ≥ 0.
Loan contracts must satisfy incentive compatibility ex post by ensuring
that a successful entrepreneur does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to abscond:
(1 −  )  ≤   −   −   =   −
max{   + ¯   −    ;0}
 
This means credit is restricted to agents with suﬃcient wealth
   ≥   + ¯  /  −    /  := ˆ  (¯  ), (CR)
If    +   >     , condition (CR) has a bite and some agents cannot obtain
a loan as ˆ  (¯  ) > 0. Further parametrical assumptions suﬃcient but by no
means necessary for our reasoning are summarized as follows.
Assumption 1 Let the following parametrical assumptions hold.
(i)    +   >     ,
(ii) (  +   )   − (  −   )  < (2   − (  −   ))   ,
(iii) (2 −   )   + 2(1 −   )  > (2(1 −   )  +   )   +    (2 −  )/ ,
(iv)    < 1/2 <  .
Part (ii) ensures that all successful workers obtain high enough income to
enable their oﬀspring to become entrepreneur, while (iii) implies that this
is not necessarily the case when obtaining a high wage with certainty. Part
(iv) implies that a ﬁrm size of two suﬃces for trickle down growth.10 Notice
that (i) implies (iii) when   > 0 is small enough. A suﬃcient condition for
(ii) when   is approaching zero is (1− )   < ( + ). That is, an economy
where Assumption 1 holds is characterized, for instance, by a very low saving
rate, eﬀective borrowing constraints for the poor, and a technology where
labor constitutes a substantial share of input cost.
10  < 1/2 requires ﬁrms with more than one worker.
114 The Domestic Economy in Autarky
We ﬁrst analyze the growth path of the domestic economy without foreign
direct investment. Key to the dynamics is the labor market equilibrium.
4.1 Labor Market
An agent   who chooses to become a worker has expected earnings     +  
if working in subsistence, and     + ¯   if working in a ﬁrm. An agent   who
becomes an entrepreneur has expected earnings     +    −    − ¯  .
The expected wage ¯   is determined on the labor market. Labor demand
is given by the measure of agents choosing to be entrepreneurs at expected
wage ¯  . An agent ﬁnds it proﬁtable to start a ﬁrm and exert eﬀort   if
    +    −    − ¯   −   ≥     + ¯  ,
which is equivalent to
¯   ≤ (   −    −  )/2 := ¯   .
¯    is the highest wage consistent with a positive measure of entrepreneurs in
ﬁrms that implement eﬀort  . As Assumption 1(i) implies that the poorest
agents are credit constrained, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Credit Rationing) If ¯   < ¯    there is credit rationing,
in that an agent   with wealth 0 ≤    < ˆ  (¯  ) strictly prefers to become
entrepreneur but cannot obtain a loan and becomes worker.






1 −  (ˆ  (¯  )) if 0 ≤ ¯   < ¯   ,
[0,1 −  (ˆ  (¯   ))] if ¯  =¯   ,
0 if ¯  >¯   .
(1)
Likewise, labor supply is the measure of agents who choose to work at ¯  :
  =
⎧
      ⎨
      ⎩
0 if ¯   <  ,
[0, (ˆ  ( ))] if ¯   =  ,
 (ˆ  (¯  )) if   < ¯   < ¯   ,
[ (ˆ  (  )),1] if ¯   = ¯   ,
1 if ¯   > ¯   .
(2)
12Since ˆ  (¯  ) is strictly increasing in ¯  , a market clearing expected wage ¯  ∗
exists and is given by




  if  (ˆ  ( )) ≥ 1/2,
¯   :  (ˆ  (¯  )) = 1/2 if  (ˆ  ( )) < 1/2 ≤  (ˆ  (¯   )),
¯    if  (ˆ  (¯   )) ≤ 1/2.
(3)
Hence, in a labor market equilibrium entrepreneurs with wealth    ≥   +
¯  ∗/  pay wage ¯  ∗ with certainty, entrepreneurs with   + ¯  ∗/  >    ≥   pay
(¯  ∗ −  (  −   ))/  in case of success and  (  −   ) in case of failure, and
those with    <   pay ¯  ∗/  in case of success and 0 in case of failure.
4.2 Dynamics
In order to keep the analysis tractable we focus on the dynamic evolution
of the measure of potential entrepreneurs in ﬁrms with    ≤  . That is, all
entrepreneurs have to borrow to ﬁnance the project.11
Assumption 2 (Dynamics) Let   −  /  <  
  and  0( ) = 1 in period 0.
This assumption facilitates the analysis of the dynamic behavior of the econ-
omy considerably implying that individual wealth is bounded above by  .
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 2, in any period   > 0 all entrepreneurs
choose eﬀort   and pay wage ¯  ∗
 /  in case of success and 0 otherwise.
Proof: A successful entrepreneur   with   ,  ≤   bequeathes less than   if
 (  − ( (  −   , ) − ¯  ∗
 )/ ) <  ,
which is implied by   −  /  <  / . Since income in this economy strictly
increases in wealth (as    − ¯   −    −   ≥ ¯  ), if initial period endowments
are bounded above by  ,   ,0 ≤  , then they are bounded above by   in any
period,   ,  ≤   for all   > 0. □
As any period’s allocation is governed by the endowment distribution,
the individual wealth transition determines the dynamics of the model. A
worker   with 0 ≤   ,  < ˆ  (¯  ∗
 ) in a successful ﬁrm obtains    ,  + ¯  ∗
 / .
11As the dynamic eﬀect of foreign direct investment works through the measure of
potential debt-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs, the presence of self-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs may
aﬀect the magnitude of the eﬀect, but not its direction.
13This gives the worker’s oﬀspring suﬃcient endowment to qualify as an en-
trepreneur given this period’s wage if  (   ,  + ¯  ∗
 / ) ≥ ˆ  (¯  ∗
 ), that is
  ,  ≥
  −   
   
¯  ∗
  −
    −   
  
:= ˜  (¯  ∗
 ). (4)
A suﬃcient condition for ˜  (¯  ∗
  ) ≤ 0 for all ¯  ∗
  ∈ [ ;¯   ] is (  +   )   − (  −
  )  < (2   − (  −   ))   . This is implied by part (ii) of Assumption 1.
A successful entrepreneur   obtains income   − (  −  , )− ¯  ∗
 / . Since
income strictly increases in wealth,   ,  ≥ ˜  (¯  ∗
 ) implies that also  ’s oﬀ-
spring may become entrepreneur (given wage ¯  ∗
 ).
Finally, an entrepreneur   in an unsuccessful ﬁrm earns 0 and bequeathes
0. Hence, occupational choice of the present generation determines the next
generation’s endowments   , +1 as follows:
(i) workers in successful ﬁrms:   , +1 ≥ ˆ  (¯  ∗
 ) ⇔   ,  ≥ ˜  (¯  ∗
  ),
(ii) workers in unsuccessful ﬁrms:   , +1 < ˆ  (¯  ∗
 ) ⇔   ,  < ˆ  (¯  ∗
  )/(  ),
(iii) entrepreneurs in successful ﬁrms:   , +1 ≥ ˆ  (¯  ∗
 ),
(iv) entrepreneurs in unsuccessful ﬁrms:   , +1 = 0.
This means that for every successful ﬁrm in period   there are at least 2 
potential entrepreneurs in period  +1, so that more and more agents outgrow
the borrowing constraint ˆ  (¯  ∗
 ). Hence, next period’s labor market wage is
weakly greater than today’s, ¯  ∗
 +1 ≥ ¯  ∗
 , which holds with equality if ¯  ∗
  = ¯   .
This gives rise to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Steady State Autarky) Suppose that (  +  )   −(  −
  )  < (2  −( −  ))   . In a steady state of the domestic labor market un-
der autarky, measure 1/2 of the population become entrepreneur, the market
wage is ¯   , and aggregate investment is  /2 yielding aggregate output   /2.
In a steady state it holds for the wealth distribution that  (ˆ  (¯   )) > 1/2.
Proof: In Appendix.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of the dynamics under autarky obtained
from a numerical example. A worker in a successful ﬁrm bequeathes suﬃ-
cient wealth to enable his oﬀspring to become entrepreneur. The parametriza-
tion is chosen such that   , +1 > ˆ  (¯   ). The contrary holds when obtaining
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unsuccessful worker
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Figure 2: Intergenerational wealth transition under autarky
5 Foreign Direct Investment
This section allows for direct investment by foreign ﬁrms in the form of set-
ting up a foreign owned ﬁrm in the domestic economy that employs domestic
agents as manager and worker.
5.1 Foreign Firms
A foreign owned ﬁrm uses the same technology as a domestic ﬁrm.12 That
is, a manager and a worker jointly produce stochastic output. The success
probability,   or 0, depends on the unobservable eﬀort of the manager as
above. In contrast to domestic ﬁrms, foreign owners have access to fric-
tionless foreign capital markets (or the internal capital market of a multi-
12Using a continuity argument one can show that our framework accommodates a small
but positive technological advantage conveyed by foreign ownership translating into higher
wages in foreign ﬁrms without altering the main ﬁnding. Absent further heterogeneity,
e.g. exact compensation of the advantage by access cost or a taste preference of agents for
domestic ﬁrms, this leads to a counterfactual complete crowding out of domestic ﬁrms.
15national), which is embodied in a foreign owner’s probability of successfully
absconding of 1 −    = 0. Therefore domestic agents employed in a foreign
ﬁrm, in particular managers, are not subject to domestic capital market
imperfections and thus bypass the domestic capital market.
Moreover, foreign ﬁrms can commit on servicing outstanding payments
even in case of a project’s failure. This is best motivated by assuming that a
foreign ﬁrm is able to diversify the risk of its projects. Findings by Acharya
et al. (2009) indicate this is indeed the case as ﬁrms accessing capital markets
with better creditor rights protection take on less risk. For instance, a foreign
owner may fund a large number of projects in the domestic economy (and
possibly also in the foreign one). If these projects’ successes are independent
events, the law of large numbers applies and the distribution of aggregate
revenue approaches probability one on its expected value. Hence, funding a
measure   of projects a foreign owner’s revenue is     . The foreign owner
ﬁnds it proﬁtable not to abscond for all level of debt since    = 1.13
5.2 Labor Market
That is, a foreign ﬁrm can oﬀer wages    for the manager and    for the
worker, and bonuses    and    contingent on the outcome of project. As
workers’ eﬀort has no eﬀect on the success probability,    = 0. In order to
induce the manager to exert eﬀort   incentive compatibility has to hold:
    ≥  . (ICF)
The foreign owner of such a ﬁrm obtains expected proﬁt
 [ ] =    −    −    −     −   .
Suppose that foreign ﬁrms can enter the domestic economy at zero cost.
Assumption 3 (Free Entry) The measure of potential foreign owners is
greater than 1/2 and  [ ] = 0.
Here an important feature of foreign ownership is the absence of barriers to
entry to the profession of manager, implying that managers do not obtain
rents.14 Managers’ and workers’ wages thus make agents indiﬀerent between
13Note that under our assumption on   a domestic agent with  i ≤   cannot commit
to pay 2  −  i + 3¯   +   in case of success, preventing diversiﬁcation by domestic owners.
14Alternate formulations could confer a comparative advantage to wealthy individuals.
In particular, the investment   may be in human capital. This may give rise to rents for
wealthy individuals and thus depress wages compared to our analysis. Since the results
would not change qualitatively we avoid this complication here.
16each occupation. This intuition underlies the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let free entry hold in a period  . Then the market wage
is ¯   , investment  /2, and output   /2. Domestic agents with    < ˆ  (¯   )
become employees, i.e. workers in domestic or foreign ﬁrms, or managers
in foreign ﬁrms. Domestic agents with    ≥ ˆ  (¯   ) are indiﬀerent between
becoming entrepreneurs or employees.
Proof: Since all agents can be manager or worker, in a labor market equilib-
rium agents must be indiﬀerent between becoming a manager and a worker,
that is    +     −   =   . With free entry    = (   −    −  )/2 = ¯   ,
and the measure of ﬁrms is 1/2.
At ¯    domestic agents are indiﬀerent between the roles of entrepreneur,
worker and manager, but only obtain a loan if   ,  ≥ ˆ  (¯   ). An agent with
  ,  < ˆ  (¯   ) cannot become entrepreneur; therefore these agents become
employees, either workers in domestic or foreign ﬁrms, or managers in foreign
ﬁrms. □
That is, free entry of foreign direct investment eﬀectively bypasses the
capital market imperfection and the domestic economy instantaneously con-
verges to its steady state.
5.3 Dynamics
Proposition 3 pins down the steady state labor market allocation in terms of
wage, investment and output. To compare the dynamics of the wealth dis-
tribution with and without foreign direct investment consider the bequests
of domestic agents earning a wage ¯   , i.e. workers and unsuccessful managers
in foreign ﬁrms. Such agents with   ,  ≤ ˆ  ( ) bequeath too little for their
oﬀspring to become entrepreneurs even in a low wage market equilibrium if
  ˆ  ( ) +  (¯    +  / ) < ˆ  ( ).
That is,
  (   −    + (2 −  ) / ) ≤ 2(1 −   )(   +   −     ),
which is implied by part (iii) of Assumption 1. This implies also that a
manager who is perpetually lucky and obtains wage ¯   + /  in every period
has wealth less than ˆ  ( ), leading to the following statement.
17Lemma 2 (Wealth Dynamics and FDI) Let free entry hold in a period
 . Then, if agent   is member of a foreign owned ﬁrm   ,  ≤ ˆ  ( ) implies
  , +1 ≤ ˆ  ( ). Moreover,   , +1 <   ,  if   ,  > ˆ  ( ).
That is, under foreign investment the measure of agents with   ,  ≥ ˆ  ( )
is strictly decreasing. Hence, in the long run all domestic investment will
be crowded out. This is in contrast to the case of autarky where domestic
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Figure 3: Intergenerational wealth transition under foreign direct investment
Figure 3 depicts the wealth transition in the numerical example allowing
for foreign owned ﬁrms. Workers’ success wages in domestic ﬁrms increase as
entrepreneurial rents are competed away. Foreign ﬁrms pay a ﬁxed salary to
all employees and a bonus to successful managers, depicted by the dashed
lines. Under our assumptions managers earning the bonus bequeath too
little for their oﬀspring to become entrepreneurs, even when ¯   =  .15
15Our argument is consistent with weakening Assumption 1 (iii) such that oﬀspring of
credit-constrained, successful managers may become entrepreneurs. The required property
is that a domestic ﬁrm enables on average more agents to become entrepreneurs in the
next periods than a foreign owned ﬁrm.
186 Withdrawal
As shown above the steady state labor market equilibria under autarky and
foreign direct investment coincide. Free entry of suﬃcient foreign owners en-
ables an economy to instantly reach the steady state with a high wage and
full employment. The two regimes diﬀer, however, in the evolution of the
wealth distribution and social mobility. While in autarky high social mo-
bility coincides with high inequality, under foreign direct investment wealth
tends to be more equally distributed, and social mobility depends on the ab-
sence of barriers of entry to the role of a manager. Since wealth inequality
is necessary to generate growth under autarky, more equal income distri-
butions under foreign direct investment may render the domestic economy
more vulnerable to shocks, in particular to withdrawal of foreign capital in
conjunction with a tightening of access to foreign credit markets.
To demonstrate this formally assume that in a period   the domestic
economy is in labor market equilibrium with free entry of foreign owners.
Denote the measure of foreign owned ﬁrms in period   by  . Assume that
  (ˆ  ( )) > 1/2, which ensures that potential entrepreneurs are scarce in
period  +1.16 Because of free entry   ∈ [  (ˆ  (¯   ))−1/2,1/2], since domestic
entrepreneurs are scarce also in  . Consider now the eﬀect of a withdrawal of
a fraction   ∈ (0,1) of foreign owners. This could be due to a productivity
shock in a foreign country, a shock to the opportunity cost of capital for
foreign owners, or a international liquidity shock. Often this is accompanied
by an increase in the interest rate domestic borrowers face when borrowing
on foreign credit markets, that is the international interest rate may increase.
Hence, a withdrawal, or sudden stop, in period   + 1 is characterized by
  +  = (1− )  and   +  =  ′ ≥  ,   = 1,2,.... Let  ′ ≤ (    − )/( −   / )
to ensure that a recovery actually takes place.
In period   + 1 the demand for labor is (1 −  )  + (1 −   +1(ˆ   +1(¯  ))),
with ˆ   +1(¯  ) =   + (¯   −     )/ ′. If
1/2 − (1 −  )  − (1 −   +1(ˆ   +1( ))) > 0, (5)
both investment and output decrease in period   + 1, since labor is under-
utilized. Note that expression (5) gives also exactly the percentage decreases
in output.
16This is the case, for instance when an economy is exposed to foreign direct investment
at an relatively early stage of development when it is relatively poor, see Lemma 2.
196.1 Recovery after Withdrawal
Suppose that output decreased in period   + 1, i.e. condition (5) holds.
This in turn implies ¯  ∗
 +1 =  . Parts (i) and (iv) of Assumption 1 imply
that     +    < ˆ  ( ) and thus only suﬃciently wealthy successful man-
agers in foreign ﬁrms and members of a successful domestic ﬁrm may be-
come entrepreneurs in   + 2. Since labor is under-utilized, all agents with
  , +1 ≥ ˆ  ( ) become domestic entrepreneurs. Since part (iii) of Assump-
tion 1 implies that   ˆ  ( ) +  (  +  / ) < ˆ  ( ), at wage   even successful
managers in foreign ﬁrms bequeath too little for their oﬀspring to become
entrepreneur. That is, the general equilibrium eﬀect of a sudden stop de-
presses wages and thus resurrects rents for domestic entrepreneurs.
But then the measure of domestic entrepreneurs in  +1, 1−  +1(ˆ   +1( ))
completely determines the speed of recovery. Indeed this measure depends
negatively on the measure of foreign ﬁrms in  ,  . That is,   has a negative
eﬀect on re-building the stock of domestic entrepreneurs in the aftermath of
a sudden stop. On the other hand, holding constant the outﬂow of owners  
in period  , by (5) the higher the measure of foreign owners   in  , the lower
the drop in output. This implies that, when holding constant the decrease
in output in   + 1, a higher measure of foreign owners   in period   unam-
biguously slows down the speed of recovery, while a qualiﬁer is needed for
an unconditional statement. In order to pin down the endowment distribu-
tion of the next generation we need to specify the assignment of indiﬀerent
agents to occupational roles in the following assumption.
Assumption 4 (Assignment) Rationing of potential entrepreneurs into
entrepreneurship, and of agents to the role of manager in foreign ﬁrms is
uniform and independent.
This is consistent with all agents ﬁrst applying for a job as manager in a
foreign ﬁrm, and potential entrepreneurs who are not hired as managers
selecting into entrepreneurship. Note that this requires the measure of po-
tential domestic entrepreneurs to be higher than the number of domestic
ﬁrms. This particular method of rationing is not crucial for the next re-
sult, which is proved in the appendix; assuming independence in rationing
is convenient for calculating marginal eﬀects, however.
Proposition 4 Let Assumptions 1 – 4 hold,   +  = (1 −  )  and   +  =
 ′ ≥   in periods   = 1,2,... Let output decrease in   + 1. Holding constant
20the output decrease or if it is suﬃciently great, the number of periods until
output recovers to the period   level increases in  ,  , and  ′.
That is, exposure to foreign direct investment incurs a risk of adverse
real consequences should foreign investment be suddenly withdrawn. With-
drawal may reintroduce credit rationing and thus reduce domestic output.17
Indeed under our assumptions high variation in payoﬀs across domestic
ﬁrms, which ensures suﬃcient concentration of high wealth in the next pe-
riod’s endowment distribution, provides a form of insurance against sudden
outﬂows.
Note that the proposition can be extended to a setting with an endoge-
nous interest rate from period   + 1 onwards. A suﬃciently eﬃcient credit
market ensures that all capital is invested if it is scarce, and recovery time
depends only on aggregate capital in   + 1. When the credit market is
imperfect, however, credit rationing causes some wealth to lie idle despite
scarcity of capital. Then recovery time depends negatively on the measure
of potential entrepreneurs in period   + 1 as above.
The severity of credit rationing in case of withdrawal depends also on
the degree of credit market imperfections. As credit market frictions be-
come less severe, the detrimental eﬀect of past foreign direct investment on
recovery time is partially mitigated, since the measure of rationed agents
  +1(ˆ   +1( )) strictly decreases in  . This argument holds for the marginal
eﬀects of a change in   while Assumption 1 holds. Of course, an increase
in   can also have a discrete eﬀect: if the increase is suﬃcient to ensure
that all members of foreign ﬁrms leave enough for their oﬀspring to become
entrepreneurs, recovery time decreases in the initial measure of foreign ﬁrms
 . This reasoning yields the following corollary, see appendix for details.
Corollary 1 (Capital Market Imperfection) The eﬀect of an increase
in   on the duration to recovery is less pronounced the higher  . If   is
suﬃciently high the time to recovery decreases in  .
That is, the stylized theoretical model predicts that the duration to
recovery is linked to the exposure to past foreign direct investment. In
particular, past foreign direct investment extends the duration to recovery
in economies with severe capital market frictions. This eﬀect is dampened
17See Eichengreen and Leblang (2003) who report a twofold eﬀect of capital account
liberalization: it seems to be associated both with eﬃciency gains in the domestic economy
and an ampliﬁcation of adverse eﬀects due to crises.
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Figure 4: Output after FDI withdrawal contingent on   and  .
or even reversed in economies where capital market frictions are less pro-
nounced. The degree of capital market imperfection in this model, i.e. the
probability   of preventing evasion of a borrower, can be understood as the
quality of creditor rights.
Figures 4 and 5 depict output growth after a sudden withdrawal of for-
eign capital, depending on the initial measure of foreign ﬁrms  . Important
for comparison with the empirical results below are the growth rates imme-
diately after the withdrawal (i.e. the slopes from period  +1 to  +2). Figure
4 illustrates Corollary 1 in that a change of   has ceteris paribus a bigger
impact for economies with more severe capital market frictions, that is lower
 . Figure 5 compares a situation where the international interest rate faced
by domestic ﬁrms remains unchanged ( ′ =  ) to a situation where the for-
eign capital withdrawal is accompanied by a shock to the interest rate for
borrowing in foreign credit markets ( ′ >  ).
6.2 Systemic Sudden Stops and the Duration of Recovery
These theoretical results link the duration of recovery after a sudden with-
drawal of foreign capital to previous foreign capital inﬂow and credit market
frictions. In particular, Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 state that past for-
eign capital inﬂows have an adverse eﬀect on the duration of recovery in the
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Figure 5: Output after FDI withdrawal contingent on   and  ′.
presence of domestic credit market frictions.
A straightforward way to test these prediction is using data from sys-
temic sudden stop episodes and subsequent recoveries. Calvo et al. (2006)
identify 33 episodes of systemic sudden stops that are followed by an output
recovery not relying on regaining access to foreign capital markets, termed
“Phoenix Miracles”. The authors deﬁne systemic sudden stops as periods of
capital inﬂow collapse and skyrocketing emerging markets aggregate bond
spreads that aﬀected a range of countries at approximately the same time
and, thus, had a systemic component. Accordingly, post-war history and
data requirements limit our sample to 33 episodes. Therefore, we empha-
size that our estimation results should be regarded as indicative rather than
concluding. However, we have recently observed substantial outﬂows of for-
eign capital in a number of emerging markets due to the ﬁnancial crisis.
The availability of data for the current episodes will eﬀectively increase our
sample and thus ﬁnally allow for a more concluding empirical analysis in
the near future.
For each of these 33 episodes, we compute the duration (in years) until
output has returned to its pre-crises level based on the Penn World Ta-
ble data on real GDP per capita.18 Our computations are based on PPP
18After the systemic sudden stop in Argentina 1982 output did not fully recover before
23adjusted real GDP data, since nominal exchange and inﬂation rates can
ﬂuctuate dramatically during systemic sudden stop episodes. Moreover, we
use per capita data since fast population growth in some countries would
otherwise bias the durations until full output recoveries downward.19
We measure the degree of a country’s credit market imperfections using
data on creditor rights protection, which are taken from Djankov et al. (2007)
(the variable is re-deﬁned such that higher values correspond to a lower
degree of ﬁnancial development). FDI inﬂows are taken from UNCTAD
(2007). We consider FDI inﬂows in the past ﬁve (ten) years before a systemic
sudden stop to capture a country’s past exposure to foreign investment.
Hence, it is safe to argue that both variables of interest, creditor rights
protection and past FDI, are exogenous to the event of a ﬁnancial crisis. In
addition we consider the following control variables: the drop in real GDP
from the pre-crises level to the through of the crises, the level of real GDP,
private investment as a share of GDP, trade as a share of GDP, and terms of
trade. Concerning the possibility of reverse causality note that this requires
that factors leading to faster output recovery also led to higher FDI in the
past – the most likely candidate is openness, which we control for. The ﬁrst
two variables are obtained from the Penn World Table (Heston et al., 2006),
the last two from the World Development Indicators. Real GDP per capita
reﬂects the market size which could mitigate the impact of a sudden stop
due to scale eﬀects. Similarly, a higher degree of private investments, trade
openness, and more beneﬁcial terms of trade are associated with a quicker
period of recovery. Finally, we include regional dummy variables for Asia,
Africa and Latin America as well as a time dummy for the 1980s.
Table 3 reports the episodes of systemic sudden stops following the def-
inition of Calvo et al. (2006). The duration to a full output recovery was
longest in El Salvador, Nigeria, and Uruguay in the 1980s, while for a num-
ber of systemic sudden stop episodes it was relatively short (two to three
years). The largest output drops from peak to trough amount to approxi-
mately 20% of GDP per capita (Uruguay and Chile in the early 1980s, and
Argentina in the late 1990s). Table 3 shows that the protection of creditor
rights and the preceding ratios of FDI over GDP vary substantially across
the country was hit by another sudden stop. In this case, we take the observation showing
the highest value of output prior to the next sudden stop as the full recovery point.
19We emphasize that we obtain the same qualitative result as in Table 4 if we base the
durations on absolute real GDP levels (instead of per capita levels) or if we alternatively
use PPP-adjusted real GDP data from the World Development Indicators.
24the diﬀerent episodes. In particular, the highest rates of past FDI in coun-
tries with weak creditor rights are observed in Argentina (1998), Colombia
(1998), Ecuador (1998), Mexico (1994), Peru (1997), and Tunisia (1981).
We estimate a generalized negative binomial regression model with dura-
tion until output has returned to its pre-crisis level as a dependent variable.
The choice of model is based on the assumption that the distribution of du-
rations is well-represented by a Poisson-like process, which accounts for the
fact that the probability of an output recovery increases over time during a
recovery period. This interdependence can lead to extra variation which is
referred to as over-dispersion. This distributional assumption is quite gen-
eral and appears to be appropriate for our setting. Moreover, we always
include heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by years to al-
low for a correlation of macroeconomic shocks across countries in a given
year. In particular, we correct standard errors for contagion eﬀects during
the Asian crisis episode which led to systemic sudden stops in Indonesia,
Malaysia, Peru, the Philippines, and Russia in 1997.20
6.3 Empirical Results
Table 4 lists the results for the generalized negative binomial regression
model. The ﬁrst two columns show that past foreign investments, on aver-
age, do not aﬀect the length of the recovery period. However, the positive
signiﬁcant interaction term with creditor rights in column two reveals that
past foreign investments prolong the duration until a full output recovery if a
country lacks creditor rights. In particular, past FDI reduces the length of a
recovery period if creditor rights are relatively well protected (CR ∈ {0;1;2})
and prolongs this period if they are not (CR ∈ {3,4}). Columns three and
four of Table 4 report that the interaction term remains signiﬁcant at a 5%
level if we include time and region dummies or additional control variables.
We note that the qualitative results in column three, which refers to our
baseline speciﬁcation, are robust to the successive exclusion of one country
at a time from the sample.21 Interestingly, the direct eﬀect of better pro-
20The clustering tends to reduce the standard errors which highlights the importance of
contagion eﬀects across countries in a given year. We note, however, that the interaction
term between past FDI and creditor rights is also positive and signiﬁcant in our basic
speciﬁcations if we do not cluster the standard errors, or if we impose alternative clustering
schemes (e.g. by decade, region, or country).
21This robustness check refers to 23 additional estimations. The results are available
from the authors upon request.
25tection of creditor rights tends to be prolonging the duration to recovery
once we control for the interaction eﬀect between creditor rights and past
exposure to FDI. This may be explained by a costly state veriﬁcation ar-
gument: better creditor rights amount to higher degree of monitoring and
inspection, which in turn generate higher cost in case of default, for instance
in form of time-consuming bankruptcy procedures that tie up capital needed
elsewhere. Substantiating the evidence on such a trade-oﬀ between static
(quick reallocation of capital) and dynamic (incentives for borrowers not
to strategically default) may provide an interesting opportunity for future
research.
In the last two columns of Table 4, we use the average foreign investments
over the past decade rather than over ﬁve years. The interaction term
remains signiﬁcant at the 5% level controlling for the drops in output during
the crises. Furthermore, in the columns ﬁve and six of Table 4, we repeat the
exercise based on the interaction of past trade with creditor rights instead of
FDI. In fact, the interaction term between past trade and creditor rights is
never signiﬁcant at conventional levels, which supports the FDI mechanism
present in our model.
Finally, we explicitly allow for a non-linear relationship between past
FDI and creditor rights protection in regressions reported in Table 5. For
the left half of the table we separate countries in two groups based on the
degree of creditor rights protection. This is captured by the dummy vari-
ables: CRgood, which is 1 if CR ∈ {0;1;2} and 0 otherwise, and CRbad, which
is 1 if CR ∈ {3;4} and 0 otherwise. The ﬁrst group covers 15 and the second
one 18 observations. We ﬁnd that past FDI does not inﬂuence the duration
to output recovery when creditor rights are relatively well protected. In con-
trast, past FDI prolongs the recovery time when creditor rights protection
is weak. The corresponding coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at a 1% level.
The right half of Table 5 shows results when including a dummy and the
corresponding interaction term of that dummy with past FDI for each of the
ﬁve realizations of CR.22 The results reveal that the average eﬀect in Table
4 conceals a signiﬁcant degree of nonlinearity. It turns out that the eﬀect
of past FDI on the duration to a full output recovery is increasingly deteri-
orating with the lack of creditor rights protection. The increase in the time
to full recovery due to past FDI is most pronounced when creditor rights
22The best realization of creditor rights protection is achieved in 2 cases, the second
best in 7, the intermediate in 6, and the two worst realizations in 9 episodes in each case,
respectively.
26drop from the second worst to the worst realization. The corresponding
coeﬃcients are all signiﬁcant at conventional levels, apart from the interac-
tion terms with the ﬁrst three creditor rights realizations (CR ∈ {0;1;2}),
which are only signiﬁcant on a 10% level. Overall, the eﬀect of past FDI
turns to prolong the duration of output recoveries in countries where cred-
itor rights are worse than their best two realizations (which corresponds to
CR ∈ {2;3;4}).
7 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the eﬀects of foreign direct investment on the wealth
dynamics of an economy with imperfect credit markets. Credit market im-
perfections assign debt-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs an important role for the in-
tertemporal accumulation of capital. Due to the lack of opportunities for
diversiﬁcation wages induce unnecessarily high-powered incentives for work-
ers. This in turn allows successful workers’ oﬀspring to become entrepreneurs
in the next period, ensuring a stock of potential entrepreneurs in the next
period. In contrast, foreign owned ﬁrms can set wages to provide adequate
incentives due to access to a superior capital market. This reduces the vari-
ance of the wage proﬁle for workers, but implies lower success wages. Yet
this reduction in individual income risk generates higher vulnerability to ag-
gregate shocks, as higher exposure to foreign investments tends to prolong
the time to recovery after sudden stops.
In setting up the theoretical model we favored ease of exposition over
generality. The model can, however, be extended in several directions qual-
itatively maintaining the results presented here. For instance, ﬁrms could
have an additional, superior technology choice enabling higher returns on
investment if accompanied by higher eﬀort investment of the manager. This
can generate a regime where foreign owned ﬁrms choose the eﬃcient technol-
ogy and a high variance wage for the manager, but not for the worker, while
domestic entrepreneurs remain too poor to ﬁnd the eﬃcient technology prof-
itable. In this regime foreign ﬁrms have high within ﬁrm wage variance, oﬀer
higher wages on average (since they choose the eﬃcient technology), but fail
to sustain a viable stock of potential domestic entrepreneurs as only success-
ful managers’ oﬀspring may become entrepreneurs. Foreign ﬁrms then crowd
out domestic debt-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2003,
oﬀer some evidence for such a contemporaneous crowding out in Belgium.).
Moreover, managers in foreign ﬁrms may earn rents in this regime, since the
27optimal incentive contract may require the manager to invest some of his
wealth in the ﬁrm.
Two more observations appear to be worth mentioning. First, foreign
direct investment tends to increase workers’ payoﬀs while decreasing en-
trepreneurs’ payoﬀs. Hence, political acceptance of foreign direct investment
increases as the pivotal agent’s wealth decreases, i.e. when extending the
franchise to the poor. Second, in the equilibrium with foreign direct invest-
ment positive net portfolio investment from the domestic into the foreign
economy may outweigh net foreign direct investment, which is consistent
with the observation by Lucas (1990). Intuitively, multinationals incorpo-
rate and collect capital on the more developed foreign capital market.
Finally, not only does the ongoing global ﬁnancial crisis demonstrate the
desirability of an economy’s ability to recover from a sudden stop, but also it
generates additional empirical observations due to collapses in foreign capital
ﬂows to emerging markets. This will contribute to overcoming the caveat of
a small sample size in our present empirical exercise, and eventually enable
policy related statements based on substantiated empirical evidence.
A Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
By (3) in a labor market equilibrium it must hold that ¯    ∈ [ ,¯   ]. Therefore
1 −   +1(ˆ  (¯  ∗
 )) ≥ 2 (1 −   (ˆ  (¯  ∗
  ))) > 1 −   (ˆ  (¯  ∗
 )).
That is, the measure of agents willing to become entrepreneurs at wage ¯  ∗
 
is greater in   + 1 than in  . By continuity of ˆ   in ¯   there exists ¯  ∗
 +1 ≥ ¯  ∗
 
that equilibrates the labor market. Hence,
1 −   +1(ˆ  (¯  ∗
 +1)) > 1 −   (ˆ  (¯  ∗
 )) if   +1(ˆ  (¯  ∗
 +1)) > 1/2,
implying ¯  ∗
  < ¯  ∗
 +1 ≤ ¯   . If   (ˆ  (¯  ∗
 )) > 1/2, then ¯  ∗
  = ¯    = ¯  ∗
 +1. That
is, next period’s market wage ¯  ∗
 +1 and the measure agents wealthy enough
to become entrepreneurs strictly increase over time while   (ˆ  (¯  ∗
 )) < 1/2
until ¯  ∗
  = ¯   . The statements on investment and output follow immediately.
Proof of Proposition 4
Note ﬁrst that if output decreases in   + 1 (expression (5) is negative) the
measure of ﬁrms in   + 1 is less than 1/2 and ¯  ∗
 +1 =  . The measure of
28domestic entrepreneurs in   + 1 is 1 −   +1(ˆ  ( )), which implies that only
agents with   , +1 < ˆ  ( ) are members of foreign owned ﬁrms. Here we
abuse notation somewhat, since the function ˆ  (¯   ) depends positively on
the interest rate  , which might increase in   + 1, from   to  ′ ≥  . Parts
(i) and (iv) of Assumption 1 imply that   ˆ  ( ) +    < ˆ  ( ), workers and
unsuccessful managers in foreign ﬁrms bequeath less than ˆ  ( ). By part
(iii) of Assumption 1 and Lemma 2 this also holds for successful managers.
Hence, potential domestic entrepreneurs in period  +2 have at most measure
1 −   +2(ˆ  ( )) = 2 (1 −   +1(ˆ  ( ))), (6)
as each successful domestic ﬁrm allows two agents to become entrepreneurs
in the next period. The measure of domestic entrepreneurs in   + 2 is then
min{1/2 − (1 −  ) ;2 (1 −   +1(ˆ   +1( ))}. Output in period   +   is
min{1/2;(1 −  )  + (1 −   + (ˆ  ( )))}  .
Hence, time to recovery is given by the lowest integer   that solves
1 −   + (ˆ  ( )) ≥ 1/2 − (1 −  ) , (7)
where we use that labor is abundant and the wage ¯  ∗
 +  =   whenever   is
less than the solution to the optimization problem in (7). Using (6) we have
1 −   + (ˆ  ( )) = (2 ) −1(1 −   +1(ˆ  ( ))).
Clearly,   depends negatively on   +1(ˆ  ( )). Since output decreased in  +1
by assumption,   > 1.
To determine   +1(ˆ   +1( )), note ﬁrst that measure 1/2 −   of agents
are domestic entrepreneurs who must have endowments   ,  > ˆ  (¯   ). Under
assumption 4 any agent becomes manager in a foreign ﬁrm with probability
 . Consistence of these facts requires that
(1 −  )(1 −   (ˆ  (¯   ))) ≥ 1/2 −  ,
implying that the measure of potential entrepreneurs exceeds the one of
actual entrepreneurs. If e.g.   = 1/ , the condition is 1/2 > 1−  (ˆ  (¯   )) ≥
(  − 2)/(2 ). Deﬁne cutoﬀ endowments ˜    and ˜    implicitly by
  ˜    +  (¯    +  / ) = ˆ  ( ) and   ˜    +  ¯    = ˆ  ( ).
Lemma 2 implies that ˜    > ˜    > ˆ  ( ) and ˜    >   by part (iii) of Assump-
tion 1. Since  ′ ≥   the measure of potential entrepreneur in   + 1 can be
calculated as follows.
1 −   +1(ˆ  ( )) = 2 (1/2 −  ) +  [ (1−  (˜   )) + (1 −  )(1−  (˜   ))].
29Using this on (7) yields
(2 ) −1 [  −    −     (˜   )] ≥ 1/2 − (1 −  ) . (8)
The RHS strictly increases in  . Since the LHS strictly decreases in  , the
condition becomes more binding as   increases when holding constant the
drop in output, i.e. 1/2 − (1 −  )  − (1 −   +1(ˆ   +1( ))) =      , or when
  is great enough, for instance whenever   > 1 − 3 /2. Noting that ˆ  ( ) in
 +1 increases in  ′ and therefore also ˜    increases in  ′ completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1
The eﬀect of a marginal increase in   on of condition (8) is
(1 −  ) − (2 ) −1 (1 +   (ˆ   ). (9)
Since ˆ  ( ) strictly decreases in  , so do both ˜    and ˜   , and the distribution
function   (.) evaluated at these points. Therefore the marginal eﬀect of an
increase in   , which is negative, is ampliﬁed as   increases.
For the second part assume that   such that (2 +   )   +     ≤ 2  +
(2  +   )   . Then ˆ  ( ) ≤  ¯    and
1 −   +1(ˆ  ( )) ≤ (1 +  )(1/2 −  ) + 2 ,
as domestic entrepreneurs who are not successful leave their oﬀspring 0
endowments. Since in addition in periods   +  ,   = 1,2,... some members
of foreign ﬁrms may leave enough to their oﬀspring to become entrepreneurs
clearly a marginal increase of   makes condition (8) less binding.
B Figures and Tables
Quantile Regressions of Foreign Ownership Premium
Figure 6 shows the result of an OLS estimation (dashed line) of (the log
of) a ﬁrm’s average wage on a dummy variable (for-OECD), which is 1 if a
ﬁrm is foreign owned and 0 otherwise. The estimation includes the same
controls as the one for Figure 1. The dotted lines display the 95% conﬁdence
intervals of the OLS coeﬃcient. Accordingly, foreign owned ﬁrms pay, on
average, higher wages than domestic ﬁrms. Figure 6 summarizes the results
of 18 diﬀerent quantile regressions at the 5%, 10%, ..., and 95% quantile,
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Figure 6: Quantile regression of average wages
the solid line. The shaded area marks the corresponding 95% conﬁdence
intervals. Foreign ownership appears to correlate positively with a wage
premium primarily for intermediate wages, giving rise to an inverted U-
shaped curve. The 95% quantile regression reveals that foreign owned ﬁrms
pay lower wages than domestic ﬁrms at the top end of the wage distribution
which implies that success wages are indeed higher among domestic ﬁrms.
31Table 1: Eﬀect of foreign ownership on high-level wages (> 90% quantile)
wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hi90 3.95∗∗∗ 3.93∗∗∗ 3.83∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 3.94∗∗∗ 3.85∗∗∗
(12.99) (13.37) (13.05) (13.53) (9.22) (9.75)
foroecd-lo90 .5800∗∗∗ .3247∗∗∗ .0756
(4.13) (2.70) (.44)
foroecd-hi90 -.0833 -.5461 -1.05∗
(-.30) (-1.46) (-1.76)
forhq-lo90 1.04∗∗ 1.02∗ -.0635
(1.94) (1.66) (-0.08)
forhq-hi90 -.8785∗ -1.38∗∗ -2.42∗∗∗
(-1.87) (-2.04) (-5.27)
part-time -.0030∗∗∗ -.0030∗∗∗ -.0288∗∗∗ -.0288∗∗∗
(-2.75) (-2.76) (-3.09) (-3.10)
education .0446∗∗∗ .0465∗∗∗ .0679∗∗ .0685∗∗
(3.76) (3.89) (2.35) (2.37)
skilled -.0007 -.0007 -.0010 -.0009
(-.55) (-.60) (-.37) (-.36)
size .2449∗∗∗ .2588∗∗∗ .2452∗∗∗ .2490∗∗∗
(4.35) (4.54) (3.38) (3.49)
exp .3702∗∗∗ .3793∗∗∗ .2489∗ .2358∗
(3.56) (3.72) (1.89) (1.81)
hire-restr -.0020∗∗ -.0019∗∗ -.0010 -.0010







R2 .804 .803 .808 .808 .825 .825
Countries/Firms 27/6235 27/6235 27/4950 27/4950 27/1628 27/1628
Industry f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Estimation period: 2004. Heteroscedasticity robust s.e., clustered at the country and
industry level. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
32Table 2: Eﬀect of foreign ownership on high-level wages (> 95% quantile)
wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
hi95 4.55∗∗∗ 4.49∗∗∗ 4.36∗∗∗ 4.28∗∗∗ 4.46∗∗∗ 4.41∗∗∗
(12.97) (13.54) (13.04) (13.37) (8.78) (9.29)
foroecd-lo95 .7443∗∗∗ .3780∗∗∗ .0829
(5.21) (3.56) (.48)
foroecd-hi95 -.5368 -1.05∗ -.9827
(-1.11) (-1.76) (-.97)
forhq-lo95 1.22∗∗∗ .9300∗ -.3524
(2.61) (1.83) (-.42)
forhq-hi95 -1.39∗∗ -1.80∗ -3.22∗∗∗
(-1.98) (-1.74) (-6.16)
part-time -.0031∗∗∗ -.0032∗∗∗ -.0299∗∗∗ .0300∗∗∗
(-2.77) (-2.78) (-3.08) (-3.09)
education .0531∗∗∗ .0554∗∗∗ .0745∗∗∗ .0742∗∗∗
(3.81) (3.97) (2.62) (2.62)
skilled -.0007 -.0008 .0003 .0003
(-.54) (-.64) (.10) (.09)
size .2861∗∗∗ .2994∗∗∗ .2437∗∗∗ .2429∗∗∗
(4.67) (4.85) (3.09) (3.13)
exp .4232∗∗∗ .4436∗∗∗ .3821∗∗ .3871∗∗
(3.76) (3.99) (2.38) (2.42)
hire-restr -.0020∗∗ -.0020∗∗ -.0011 -.0010







R2 .783 .782 .788 .787 .808 .808
Countries/Firms 27/6235 27/6235 27/4950 27/4950 27/1628 27/1628
Industry f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes
Estimation period: 2004. Heteroscedasticity robust s.e. clustered at the country and
industry level. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
33Table 3: Episodes of systemic sudden stops
country year duration output drop creditor rights past FDI/GDP
Argentina 1980 4 -12.91 3 0.36
Argentina 1994 2 -3.69 3 1.15
Argentina 1998 6 -19.89 3 2.00
Brazil 1980 5 -11.92 3 1.07
Chile 1981 5 -20.59 2 0.91
Chile 1998 2 -1.01 2 4.87
Colombia 1998 5 -2.04 4 1.92
Cote d’Ivoire 1982 4 -7.20 4 0.41
Ecuador 1981 3 -7.40 4 0.69
Ecuador 1998 6 -4.04 4 2.78
El Salvador 1980 12 -9.65 1 0.21
Indonesia 1997 5 -9.34 1 3.29
Lebanon 1999 5 -9.65 0 2.48
Malaysia 1997 2 -2.74 1 5.35
Mexico 1981 4 -10.42 4 0.66
Mexico 1994 3 -7.91 4 1.39
Morocco 1980 2 -1.17 3 0.13
Morocco 1982 2 -2.79 3 0.18
Morocco 1994 2 -8.86 3 0.72
Morocco 1996 2 -4.87 3 0.70
Nigeria 1980 11 -10.58 0 0.06
Peru 1981 5 -15.55 4 0.26
Peru 1997 5 -2.59 4 4.28
Philippines 1997 2 -5.70 3 1.25
Russia 1997 2 -2.65 2 0.36
South Africa 1981 3 1.06 1 -0.10
South Korea 1997 2 -9.02 1 0.33
Thailand 1996 6 -11.57 1 1.41
Tunisia 1981 2 -2.11 4 1.82
Turkey 1993 3 -7.20 2 0.35
Turkey 1998 2 -4.71 2 0.32
Uruguay 1981 10 -21.96 2 2.16
Venezuela 1980 7 -13.40 1 0.07
All 33 episodes refer to systemic sudden stops that are followed by an output recovery
that does not rely on regaining access to foreign capital markets, termed “Phoenix
Miracles”. The identiﬁcation of these periods follows the deﬁnition of Calvo et al. (2006).
34Table 4: General. negative binomial model, dependent variable is duration
Speciﬁcation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)1) (8)1)
Past FDI/GDP -.0211 -.2557∗ -.1939∗ -.1456∗∗ -.204 -.2341
(-.42) (-1.87) (-1.68) (-2.04) (-1.25) (-1.57 )
Creditor Rights -.1526 -.3205∗∗ -.3391∗∗∗ -.3338∗∗∗ -.3799∗∗∗ -.3141∗∗ -.3659∗∗∗ -.3693∗∗∗
(-1.33) (-2.41) (-4.46) (-7.19) (-2.81) (-2.47) (-3.47) (-4.02)
Past FDI∗CR .1186∗∗ .1166∗∗∗ .0831∗∗∗ .1163 .1595∗∗
(2.26) (3.10) (3.44) (1.33) (2.15 )
Drop real GDP -.0357∗∗∗ -.0398∗∗∗ -.0258∗∗∗ -.0359∗∗∗







Terms of trade -.0008
(-.73)
Past trade/GDP -.0051∗ -.0026
(-1.84) (-.86)
Past Trade∗CR .0021 .0016
(1.21) (1.07)
Reg./Time dummies no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 33 33 33 33 33 33 31 31
1) Past FDI captures the averages over the last ten years instead of ﬁve.
Always include a constant and heteroscedasticity robust s.e., which are clustered each year to allow for a yearly
correlation of macro shocks across countries. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, 10%. We
include a time dummy for the 1980s and three regional dummies for Latin America, Asia, and Africa.
35Table 5: General. negative binomial model, dependent variable is duration
   ∈ {0;1;2} vs.    ∈ {3;4} Eﬀects by each CR
Drop real GDP -.0441∗∗∗ Drop real GDP -.0582∗∗∗
(-4.79) (-4.39)
Creditor Rights -.3125∗∗∗ CR1 -.3890∗∗
(-4.27) (-2.26)
Past FDI∗CRgood -.0017 CR2 -1.10∗∗∗
(-.08) (-3.97)














Time dummies yes yes
Observations 33 33
Good creditor rights protection       :    ∈ {0;1;2}; bad creditor
rights protection      :    ∈ {3;4}.
Always include heteroscedasticity robust s.e. which are clustered each
year. t-statistics in parenthesis. ***,**,* signiﬁcant at 1%, 5%, 10%.
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